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Séminaires thématiques
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Séminaires thématiques
Séminaires thématiques

12 DEC 2008

DEC08 - Séminaire SPOC (Service Public, Organisation et Contrats)
Lieu : IAE de Paris, France
Date : 12 DEC 2008

Horaire : 13h30

Pierre Garrouste,  Professeur à l'Université Lumière-Lyon 2
Motivation, incentives and performance in the public sector
A now important literature has investigated and still investigates the relationships between motivation, incentives and effort. Even if there is still some reluctance to address this issue, there is an agreement on the fact that incentives are not always enhancing effort. Different explanations have been pointed out both in economics and psychology1. There is however a less important but fast growing literature concerning the links between motivation, incentives and effort in the public sector. Basically, this literature has grown out of the movement for undertaking reforms in most OECD countries in order to render their public sector more efficient and want to measure more precisely the performance of their public activities2. In fact, the current contributions in this field of research can be classified into two main categories. The first deals with the definition of principles (mainly methodological) concerning measurement of performance within the public sector (Atkinson, 2005; Bureau and Mougeot, 2007). The second is concerned with the analysis of the relationships between incentives and performance in the public sector3. These two frames are not independent and equally necessary but focus on different aspects of what can, broadly speaking, be called the analysis of the efficiency of the public sector.

Pour plus d'informations, voir http://www.chaire-eppp.org

19 DEC 2008

DEC08 - Séminaire SPOC (Service Public, Organisation et Contrats)
Lieu : IAE de Paris, France
Date : 19 DEC 2008

Horaire : 12h30

Aude LE LANNIER , Doctorante, Université paris Sud 11
Enforcement des contrats de régulation incitative : Regulation Individuelle versus Comparative
Résumé : La concurrence par comparaison a fait l’objet de nombreux travaux mettant en évidence son efficacité, notamment en termes d’extraction de rentes informationnelles et d’incitation à l’effort. Néanmoins, nous pouvons constater que, de nos jours, peu de régulateurs utilisent de façon stricte ce type de contrat de régulation. Ceci, au profit soit de formes plus « souples » de concurrence par comparaison, soit d’une régulation incitative individuelle (price cap, revenue cap etc). L’un des arguments avancés, aussi bien dans la littérature théoriques que dans les études plus appliquées, réside dans le fait que la concurrence par comparaison entraînerait des difficultés d’enforcement. Or, en nous basant sur les modèles canoniques de Laffont [2003,2005] et Guasch, Laffont et Straub [2006,2008] qui traitent de la régulation incitative individuelle, nous montrons que (1) la concurrence par comparaison permet de limiter les contraintes incitatives que doit respecter le régulateur lors de l’application de son contrat de régulation, et que (2) la régulation par comparaison permet de limiter les contraintes de participation des firmes, et donc, elle permet d’éliminer les difficultés d’enforcement rencontrées avec une régulation individuelle.

05 Décembre 2008

DEC08 - Séminaire SPOC (Service Public, Organisation et Contrats)
Lieu : IAE de Paris, France
Date : 05 Décembre 2008

De 12h30 à 13h30
Anne YVRANDE-BILLON,French Council of Economic Analysis
Make or Buy Urban Transport Services: A Rational Choice?
In this article, our aim is to study the determinants of the trade-o between in-house and outsourced utilities provision. More precisely, we focus on the French urban public transport sector. With regard to the issue we are interested in, this case is a particularly rich domain since, in France, the local authorities in charge of regulating the procurement of urban public transport services can choose between direct provision and outsourcing. In this latter case, they even have an additional option since they can contract out the operation of service either to semi-public companies or to fully private rms. Using an original database covering 154 di erent French urban transport networks, we estimate the impact on organisational choices of network and service characteristics (size of the network, population density, level of demand uncertainty) and institu- tional dimensions (legal status of local regulators, percentage of other services already outsourced, political orientation). Our results allow shedding light on the economic rationale behind the choice of a mode of governance. Indeed, although most of the interpretations of the organizational decisions made by local governments in utilities sectors concentrate on political factors, we show that there are rooms for economic explanations.

21 Novembre 2008

NOV08 - Séminaire SPOC (Service Public, Organisation et Contrats)
Lieu : IAE de Paris, France
Date : 21 Novembre 2008

De 12h30 à 13h30
Carine STAROPOLI, Université  Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
An Experimental Study of Investment Incentives In The Electricity Industry
Energy-only markets tend not to produce the adequate incentives to suppliers to engage the right amount of investment in the right type of technology and in the right location in the network to satisfy a reliability standard at least cost1. Market failures in energy spot market typically result in price spikes that are too infrequent and temporary to motivate efficient investment in new capacities as would market theory expect. It suggests finding alternatives to these “energy-only markets” situation where there is no additional incentive mechanism to the price of the energy spot market to guide investment behaviour. In fact, here are various socalled “capacity mechanisms” which aim at replacing the investment incentives that are provided by price spikes with a more stable incentive that relies on the reduction of investment risks. However, in the market design arena, there is still no consensus today on the best way to proceed, as reflected by the different designs of capacity mechanisms that have been applied in practice and the debates on new mechanisms that are still going on among academics (De Vries 2004; Vazquez et al. 2002; Perrez Arriaga et al. 2006).

31 Octobre 2008

OCT08 - Séminaire SPOC (Service Public, Organisation et Contrats)
Lieu : IAE de Paris, France
Date : 31 Octobre 2008

De 12h30 à 14h30
Claudine DESRIEUX & Jean BEUVE, University Paris I Sorbonne and Paris 11 Sud
Relational Contract and the Dynamics of Contractual Incompleteness

17 Octobre 2008

OCT08 - Séminaire SPOC (Service Public, Organisation et Contrats)
Lieu : IAE de Paris, France
Date : 17 Octobre 2008

De 11h à 12h30
Ariane LAMBERT-MOGILIANSKY, Ecole d'Economie de Paris
Public Market tailored for the Cartel - Favoritism in Procurement Auction

02 Octobre 2008

OCT08 - Séminaire SPOC (Service Public, Organisation et Contrats)
Lieu : IAE de Paris, France
Date : 02 Octobre 2008

De 10h30 à 12h30
Pablo SPILLER, University of California Berkeley
An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications
The fundamental feature of private contracting is its relational nature. When faced with unforeseen or unexpected circumstances, private parties, as long as the relation remains worthwhile, adjust their required performance without the need for costly renegotiation or formal recontracting. Public contracting, on the other hand, seems to be characterized by formalized, standardized, bureaucratic, rigid procedures. Common wisdom sees public contracts as generally more inflexible, requiring more frequent formal renegotiation, having a higher tendency to litigate, and providing weaker incentives. In sum, public contracts are perceived to be less ''efficient.'' In this paper I develop a theory of public contracting that accommodates these stark differences between private and public contracting. The thrust of the paper is that these differences arise directly because of the different hazards present in public and purely private contracts, which directly impact the nature of the resulting contractual forms. A fundamental corollary of this result is that the perceived inefficiency of public or governmental contracting is simply the result of contractual adaptation to different inherent hazards, and as such is not directly remediable. Finally, I apply the main insights from the general framework developed here to understand the characteristics of concession contracts.
NBER Working Paper No. 14152, Issued in August 2008